We study and compare equilibrium platforms in models of one-dimensional electoral competition with two and four policy-motivated parties. We first analyse the plurality game, where the party that gets the most votes is elected and implements its proposed platform. Restrictions on the set of credible announcements are needed to get existence of equilibria. Comparing equilibria with two and four parties, we obtain that moderate parties react to the introduction of extreme parties by proposing the same or more extreme equilibrium platforms. We then study the proportional system, where the policy implemented is a weighted sum of the proposals, with the voting shares as weights. Here, the existence of extreme parties leads moderate ones to choose more centrist platforms.
Introduction
The traditional model of electoral competition, known as the Downsian model, is characterized by two key features. First, the political parties are able to commit to the policy announced during the electoral campaign. Second, they do not care about the policy implemented, their only goal being to be elected. When there are two parties, the policy space is unidimensional and voters' preferences satisfy some conditions (single-peakedness, single-crossing), we end up with the median voter theorem: the parties adopt the same position at equilibrium, this position corresponding to the median of the ideal policies of the voters. Considering multidimensional voting or more than two parties leads to much less optimistic and clear-cut results. In the first case, there is generically no equilibrium as shown for example by Plott(1967) . When there are more than two candidates and voting is sincere, Osborne(1993) argues that an equilibrium is unlikely to exist. 1 Although the Downsian approach has been the dominant model in political economy for a long time, its basic premises are questionable. Parties do have policy preferences and they happen to renege on their campaign promises. Roemer(2001) , building on work by Wittman(1983) and keeping the assumption of commitment, develops a theory of political competition with parties having policy preferences. In the one dimensional case, he shows that parties propose the median ideal policy if there is no uncertainty, because parties must propose this policy in order to win the election and to influence the policy implemented. However, introducing uncertainty on the voting behavior of the citizens leads the parties to propose differentiated policies at equilibrium.
If one acknowledges that parties attach some importance to the policy implemented then commitment becomes an issue. 2 Indeed, in a one shot game, they should implement their preferred policy once they have been elected. Rational voters anticipate this and do not believe any promise different from the ideal policies of the parties. Matters are clearly different when the game is repeated. Alesina(1988) shows that parties credibly converge to the center of the political spectrum in a repeated elections setting. The basic idea supporting this result is that the parties, who are risk averse, prefer to have a moderate policy for sure than different extreme policies at random. In this model, voters are not strategic and the result only stems from the interaction between the parties. Aragones and Postlewaite(2000) consider also a repeated elections model, but with strategic voters, who punish the parties implementing a policy different from the one announced during the campaign. They obtain that the parties can credibly commit to policies belonging to an interval centered on their ideal policies. If they announce a platform too far away from their preferred one, the voters recognize that their incentives to renege on their promise is too high and they punish the party by not reelecting it in the future.
In this model, we consider an electoral competition game with policy motivated candidates.
Mainly, two questions are addressed. First, we are interested in knowing under which circumstances an equilibrium with more than two parties exists. Second, we want to determine the impact on the political equilibrium, starting from the standard two party case, of introducing extreme parties in the analysis. Our interest for this question has been aroused by the development of extreme political parties in many European countries, such as Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria or France. We study a setting where parties and voters have symmetric, single-peaked utility functions and where voting is sincere. The distribution of the voters' and parties' preferred policies is also symmetric. Two electoral rules are considered: plurality rule and proportional representation. In the first case, the party obtaining the largest number of votes is elected and chooses a policy. In the second case, the implemented policy is a weighted sum of the platforms of the parties, where the weights correspond to the number of votes received by the parties. This second framework has been adopted by Ortuño-Ortin(1997) in the two party case.
In this setting, we first show that there is generally no equilibrium under plurality rule with four parties, two moderates and two extremes, when any announcement is credible. From the discussion above, we know that the assumption of perfect commitment is not reasonable when parties are policy motivated. We thus follow Aragones and Postlewaite(2000) and assume that there exist credibility sets containing the credible announcements of a party. Under this assumption, equilibria with four parties possibly exist. Compared to the two party case, moderate parties propose either the same or more extreme policies. The intuition is the following. We start with the equilibrium proposals with only two parties, where each party proposes the credible policy that is closest to the median. Faced with the introduction of two extreme parties, moderate parties get more extreme if, by deviating, they attract more votes from extreme voters than they lose from centrists, i.e. if there are not too many centrists in the voters population.
On the other hand, they cannot move closer to the center even if they wished since they already are on the boundary of their credibility set. In other words, the centripetal forces embedded in the plurality system are maximum with only two parties, and the introduction of extreme parties can only dampen these forces and lead to more extreme platforms from moderate parties.
Considering proportional representation, we find that an equilibrium with four parties generally exists and that moderate parties choose more moderate platforms than in the two party case.
The intuition for this result goes as follows. Observe first that, with a symmetrical equilibrium, the policy implemented is that of the median voter. The left (moderate) party would thus like to decrease the implemented policy. Compared with the two party case, the introduction of extreme parties adds a new incentive for the left party to move closer to the median. Such a move will increase the extreme left party share of the vote at the expense of the left party, which is a very effective way to decrease the implemented policy since the extreme left party platform is the most leftist among the policies proposed. With an added incentive to move closer to the median, moderate parties end up with more moderate platforms than without extreme parties.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 studies plurality rule while section 4 analyzes proportional representation. Section 5 concludes. All the proofs of the propositions are in the Appendix.
The model
The set of possible policies is P = [−1, 1]. There are four political parties: extreme left (EL), left (L), right (R) and extreme right (ER). Their ideal policies are respectively denoted b
R, ER, are given by a utility function v i : P → <, assumed to be single-peaked and symmetric around its mode, b α i .
Each voter has a single-peaked, symmetric utility function. The distribution of voters' ideal policies has a cumulative distribution function F over P. The density function, f , is continuous everywhere and symmetric around 0. Voting is assumed to be sincere, that is an individual votes for the party whose platform is closest to her ideal point. We denote by α i the platform proposed by party i = EL, L, R, ER.
We study both the cases where there are two parties (L and R) and where there are four (EL, L, R, ER). The number of votes received by each party is
in the two party case where α L < α R and
Plurality rule
Election is held according to plurality rule. The party with the largest number of votes is elected and implements its announced platform. In case of a tie, each party is elected with equal probability. Each party's goal is to maximize its expected utility. Party j (j = EL, L, R, ER)'s expected utility is given by:
where π i is the probability that party i be elected.
In the rest of the section, with the exception of Proposition 1, we restrict the set of platforms that can be credibly made by parties. We adopt a simple formulation, which can be rationalized using the reputation model of Aragones and Postlewaite(2000) . The set of credible promises of
We assume in the following that d i = d for all i. Moreover, the credibility intervals do not overlap:
Observe in particular that this implies that credible announcements of L and R are to the left and to the right of 0, respectively. If a party makes an announcement outside the credibility set, then the voters believe it would implement its ideal policy if elected.
We first study the equilibria with two political parties (L and R) and then with four parties.
Two party competition
In the standard Wittman model without uncertainty, the two parties announce the ideal position of the median voter, namely 0. Here the only modification is that the parties will not choose a policy outside the credible set. The equilibrium platforms are then
There is still "maximal" convergence.
Four party competition
We first show that there are no equilibria with four parties when any announcement is credible.
Proposition 1 Non existence of equilibria when any platform is credible
Assume that all platforms are credible and that, at equilibrium, policy announcements follow the same ranking as parties' ideal policies:
There is no pure strategy symmetric equilibrium.
To prove part (i), we show that for any configuration of platforms whose ranking is the same as the ideal points ranking, at least one party has an interest to deviate marginally. 3 To prove part (ii), we have to use non marginal deviations, for which the ranking of the proposed platforms differ from the ranking of ideal points. The meaning of the two assumptions exposed in part (ii) is clear. The assumption that b α EL = −b α ER ≤ −1/2 makes sure that any extreme party prefers any policy on its side of the political spectrum to any policy on the other side.
Moreover, the EL (resp. ER) party prefers any policy to the left (resp. right) of x > 0 (resp.
x < 0) to policy x. Both consequences seem very much in accord with our intuition of what preferences of extreme parties should be. The second assumption guarantees that an extreme party cannot win the elections outright by proposing its most preferred policy. This puts an upperbound of one fourth on the proportion of voters with more extreme views than that of any extreme party.
Note also that we have not shown in Proposition 1 that equilibria where the ranking of announcements is not the same as the ranking of parties' ideal points fail to exist. However, it seems to us highly improbable that voters would consider any announced platform as credible.
We thus restrict in the following the set of platforms that can be credibly made by parties. We now give existence results for equilibria when credibility sets are imposed.
Proposition 2 Symmetric equilibria where central parties tie for victory
Assume that only platforms in the interval
are credible for party i = EL, L, R, ER.
(i) For all d such that credibility intervals do not overlap, the platforms
(ii) For all d such that credibility intervals do not overlap, the platforms
In the two kinds of equilibria described in this proposition, extreme parties are sure losers whereas L and R tie for winning. Extreme parties would like to deviate toward the extreme in order to induce the victory of the closest moderate party. They cannot credibly make such a deviation because their platform lies on the boundary of their credibility set. Condition (4), or in the second case, the more restrictive condition (6) guarantees that they do not wish to deviate towards the center.
In the first equilibrium, moderate parties propose their most extreme credible platform. They do not deviate toward the center. Consider for example party L. If it deviates to the right, it attracts votes from centrist voters, who were previously supporting party R. However, it also loses votes to the benefit of EL. When (5) holds, not only the net effect is negative, that is L loses votes if it moves toward the center, but it loses more votes than R. As a consequence, R is elected for sure following such a move and L should not deviate. Note that condition (5) can hold only if the density function f (.) has at least two modes. It follows that, with a unimodal density function, such an equilibrium does not exist.
On the contrary, the second equilibrium described in the proposition is compatible with a unimodal density function. In this equilibrium, moderate parties want to deviate to the center, for the reason that a lot of people are concentrated there. What prevents them from doing this are simply credibility reasons.
Observe also that, with d sufficiently small, we only have to concentrate on local deviations.
Building on footnote 3, the only possible symmetric equilibrium is one where L proposes its most preferred policy and ties for winning with R and where EL and ER are located at -1 and 1 respectively. This equilibrium would arise if and only if
In Proposition 2, extreme parties are sure losers. We investigate in the following proposition whether there exist (symmetric) equilibria in which they have some chance of winning. (i) At an equilibrium in which EL and ER tie for victory and L and R are sure losers, we nec-
(ii) A sufficient condition for the existence of such an equilibrium for d small enough is given by
(iii) A sufficient condition for the non existence of such an equilibrium is given by
The first part of the proposition identifies the only configuration of platforms that could constitute an equilibrium where extreme parties tie for victory. Since, at such an equilibrium, all parties have an incentive to deviate slightly towards the center of the policy spectrum, they all propose their most moderate but still credible platform.
The second part of the proposition identifies a sufficient condition for the existence of such an equilibrium: condition (8), which says that people who prefer the ideal policy of party EL (resp. ER) outnumber those who prefer the ideal policy of L (resp. R). It does not then come as a surprise that an equilibrium with extreme parties winning exist.
However, condition (8) is not necessary and one can find examples in which it is violated and an equilibrium nevertheless exists. Therefore, even if L's ideal policy is more popular than EL's, L may still lose the election. The reason for this result is that if L deviates to the left, it may obtain more votes than EL but less votes than ER which becomes the only winner of the election. Condition (9) gives a lower bound on the popularity of EL's ideal policy for such an equilibrium to potentially exist. If EL's popularity is less than this threshold, L becomes the winner of the election when EL deviates to b α EL − d. For this deviation to be in the interest of EL, (10) must hold, that is EL must prefer that L be the winner alone rather than a tie between EL and ER. This is a mild condition as it is satisfied as soon as the utility function of
Together, conditions (9) and (10) then constitute sufficient conditions for the non existence of any equilibrium where extreme parties tie for winning.
Proportional representation
We now turn to the case of proportional representation. In this setting, the policy implemented is not the announced policy of the party with the highest voting score but a weighted average of the policies announced by the four parties, where the weights correspond to the proportion of votes obtained by each party. This corresponds to a special case of the analysis in Ortuño-Ortin for two party competition. The policy implemented is given by
and
in the cases of two party and four party competition respectively. The payoff function of party i is
As before we proceed in two steps, describing first the equilibrium of the two party game and then the four party game.
Two party competition
We describe in the following proposition the symmetric equilibrium when there are only two parties.
Proposition 4 A sufficient condition for the existence of a symmetric equilibrium of the two party competition game is that F (x) be log concave (f (x) /F (x) decreasing with x). The platforms proposed by the parties at equilibrium are:
The logic of the proof is the following. From (1) and (11), the implemented policy for given platforms α L and α R is
At a symmetric equilibrium, α = 0. Necessary conditions for an interior equilibrium are then that dα/dα L = 0 and dα/dα R = 0, which are given by, respectively, equations (13) and (14) in the appendix. Consider for example the case of party L. On the one hand, increasing α L allows to increase the number of votes and therefore the weight received by α L . It also decreases the weight received by the platform proposed by party R. These two effects correspond to the first and third term in (13). As long as α L < α R , the net effect is to decrease α. On the other hand, increasing α L leads to a mechanical increase in α, for given weights. This effect is represented by the second term in (13). At the interior solution, both effects cancel out. Moreover, the condition that f (x) /F (x) be decreasing with x is sufficient to guarantee that the second order conditions are satisfied. As for the corner equilibrium (α L = −1, α R = 1), we check that α is increasing in both α L and α R at the equilibrium, meaning that no party has an incentive to deviate towards the center.
The condition we obtain on the hazard rate is mirrored in Ortuño-Ortin (1997, Proposition 4). Our restricting to symmetric distribution functions, symmetric parties' ideal points and symmetric equilibria allows us to go further than Ortuño-Ortin and to obtain information on the platforms proposed at equilibrium. Their most striking characteristic is that they are independent of the parties' most preferred policies (as long as b α L < 0 and thus that b α R > 0). One can also show that the interior equilibrium will emerge with all unimodal distributions of voters' ideal points. Moreover, a non unimodal distribution is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the appearance of a corner equilibrium. Finally, note that in all cases the policy that is implemented is that most preferred by the median voter.
It is important to notice that Proposition 4 generalizes to non symmetric distribution functions and non symmetric parties ideal policies. At equilibrium, the policy implemented is still the median ideal policy. This is obtained by observing that (13) and (14) can be satisfied simultaneously if and only if
For such an equilibrium to exist, one must have b A last remark concerns the existence of asymmetric equilibria. Indeed, equilibria such that α = b α R (resp. α = b α L ) and dα/dα L = 0 (resp. dα/dα R = 0) cannot be a priori ruled out.
Four party competition
Proposition 5 Any completely interior symmetric equilibrium (−1 < α EL < α L ) of the four party competition game satisfies
A sufficient condition for the second order condition to be satisfied is that f (x)/F (x) be decreasing in x.
If f (0) > 1/2, any symmetric equilibrium is either completely or partially (−1 = α EL < α L )
interior. In both cases, the platforms chosen by L and R are closer to 0 than in the two party case.
The main difference between propositions 4 and 5 is that moderate parties platforms are closer to the median with four than with just two parties. This is true whether the equilibrium is interior or not. Consider the case f (0) ≤ 1/2. In the two party competition, the parties locate at the boundaries of the political space. Moderate parties are then necessarily closer to the center when there are four parties. Consider now the converse case f (0) > 1/2. This leads to an interior equilibrium in the two party case. We show that whether the equilibrium with four parties is completely or partially interior (a full corner solution is impossible in this case), the moderate parties choose more centrist policies.
The intuition for this result runs as follows. Consider the consequences of an increase in party L's platform. The effects described after the statement of proposition 4 are still at work. On the one hand, the left party gains votes at the expense of the right party, the electoral constitution then putting more weight on the left platform and less on the right. On the other hand, for given weights the implemented policy increases following the increase in the left's platform. Observe first that this second effect is smaller with four parties since the vote share of the left is smaller
) . Furthermore, another effect appears, since the left party now loses votes to the extreme left, which in turn lowers the value of the implemented policy. The net effect of the introduction of extreme parties is thus to make an increase of the left party platform more appealing, resulting in a more moderate platform at equilibrium. Notwithstanding this effect, the implemented policy is unaffected by the number of parties since we concentrate on symmetric equilibria.
Conclusion
This paper constitutes an attempt to formalize electoral competition with more than two parties.
Two main results emerge. First, equilibrium existence with four parties competing for election is unlikely under plurality unless one places bounds on the promises that parties can credibly make. Second, the introduction of extreme parties induces moderate parties to propose more extreme policies under plurality whereas we obtain the converse effect in a proportional system. We believe that these results are of interest, allowing to explain some of the features of the political systems in european countries, in which many political parties are active. However our analysis is too restrictive to pretend deliver general insights. In particular, future research should be devoted to relax the various symmetry assumptions that are made throughout the paper.
Appendix
Before proving Proposition 1, we state the following useful lemma whose proof is immediate and left to the reader.
EL (resp. ER) prefers any policy x < 0 (resp. x > 0) to any policy y > 0 (resp. y < 0)
2) Fix any policy x > 0 (resp. x < 0). Then, EL (resp. ER) prefers any policy smaller (resp. larger) than x to policy x.
Proof. of Proposition 1
(i) Symmetric equilibrium.
Four cases must be distinguished:
In such a symmetric equilibrium, either all parties tie for victory or only two (the two moderate or the two extreme ones) do. If only two tie for victory, one sure loser can always ensure the victory of the party whose platform it prefers (i.e. the party on the same side of the political spectrum) by deviating. 4 If all parties tie for victory, each extreme party has an incentive to adopt a less extreme position in order to attract votes from moderate individuals.
Platforms α L and α R are implemented with probability 1/2. If EL deviates slightly to the left, then either L or EL is elected for sure and EL is better off. Therefore EL should deviate.
As in case 1, extreme parties should deviate (marginally) towards the center when their probability of winning is not 0. In the converse case, a sufficiently large deviation towards the center allows an extreme party to be elected for sure with a preferred policy (without deviating, the policy implemented is 0).
A left (resp. right) party deviates to the left (resp. right) and wins for sure with a policy it prefers to 0.
(ii) Asymmetric equilibrium.
We first study the case where two or more candidates tie for victory. We treat separately the cases where winners offer different platforms and the case where they make the same offer.
We first claim that, if parties tying for victory offer different platforms, extreme parties always have an incentive to deviate. A first subcase arises when (at least) one of the tied winners is an extreme party. Three possibilities open up:
-the extreme party prefers its own platform to the platform proposed by any other tied winner. The extreme party then has an incentive to deviate towards the center, which ensures it to win the election.
-the extreme party is indifferent between its platform and that proposed by another tied winner. Its most preferred platform then lies in between these two platforms, and deviating towards the center allows it to win with a platform closer to its most preferred one.
-the extreme party prefers another tied winner's platform to its own. W.l.og., assume that this extreme party is EL. We first prove that the only platform that could be preferred by EL to its own is that proposed by L. The argument consists in two steps. First, it is impossible to have an equilibrium situation with tied winners and three proposed platforms on the same side of 0. In such a case, the extreme party with the only platform on a given side of 0 would win for sure by moving sufficiently closed to 0, and Lemma 1 guarantees that it would benefit from this move. Second, since two platforms must be located on each side of 0, Lemma 1 ensures that the only policy who might be preferred by an extreme party to its own is that proposed by its neighbor. Finally, if EL prefers the policy proposed by L to its own, and if both tie for winning, than EL can guarantee that L win for sure by deviating to -1.
The second subcase of tied winners with different platforms that we consider is that where no extreme party ties for winning, i.e. when the two moderate parties tie for winning with different platforms. In this case, it is impossible for both extreme parties to be indifferent between the policies proposed by L and R, and any non-indifferent extreme party can guarantee the victory of the moderate policy it prefers by moving close to the other moderate platform but further from the center than this latter.
We now show that the situation where tied winners offer the same platform can not be an equilibrium either. The reasoning above shows that no equilibrium can have three parties proposing the same policy (and thus ending up on the same side of 0) and tying for winning. We then have to treat the two following cases: one extreme and one moderate parties tying, and two moderates tying. Consider the first case, where EL and L tie for winning. They must propose a policy x < 0 (or else EL would be better off by deviating to the left and win the elections).
Moreover, to tie for winning, EL and L must together win more than half of the votes, which means that the policy proposed by R (and a fortiori by ER) must be greater than |x| . But then, ER has an incentive to move to the immediate left of |x| in order to win the election or make R win with a policy that it prefers to x < 0 according to Lemma 1. The other case with tied winners offering the same platform would involve both L and R proposing the same policy x.
If x differs from 0, the extreme party located on the other side of zero would win outright by moving sufficiently close to zero (once more, lemma 1 ensures that this party benefits from this move). If x = 0, any extreme party would win by moving sufficiently close to zero and would benefit from this move.
We consider next the possibility of an equilibrium with one party being the sure winner. We first treat the case where the winner is a moderate party. Suppose w.l.o.g. that this is party R.
Its location must then be b α R , otherwise R would have an incentive to move closer to its ideal point.
The number of votes obtained by each party is
If EL deviates to b α R − ε, with ε small, we have
If A+B > max {C, D, E}, L is elected and implements α L . Since b α EL ≤ 1/2, EL prefers any pol- Suppose now that party ER is the winner. By the same argument presented above, the platform chosen by this party must be b α ER . Assumed for the moment that all parties propose different platforms. In this case, the number of votes for each party is given by:
If EL deviates to b α ER − ε, we get n ER = A, n R = C, n L = D + E and n EL = B. Three cases must be distinguished: In all these three cases, EL is better off following the deviation since it prefers any policy to the left of b α ER to b α ER . Finally, note that, under ( 
Then R receives more votes than EL for any
which is condition (4) . Notice further that this condition, together with the symmetry of the Deviations by L. As before a deviation to the left by L is equivalent to a deviation to b α L .
We then look at deviations to the right by party L. We write the number of votes received by parties L and R as a function of the location of party L, α L :
The effect of a marginal deviation, dα L , on the number of votes is given by:
When moving to the right, L receives additional votes from people previously supporting R.
However it also loses votes to EL. A sufficient condition for any deviation to the right from α L = b α L − d not to be profitable for party L is that n L − n R be strictly decreasing on the whole credibility interval, i.e. to have
Then R is elected for sure and L is strictly worse off. Note that this condition is satisfied only if the distribution of ideal points has at least two modes, since
(ii) Party EL maximizes the number of votes it obtains by moving to b α EL + d in which case it gets a number of votes equal to F µ b
Condition (6) then ensures that EL does not deviate towards the center and that moderate parties tie for winning. The proof that L does not wish to deviate follows the same line as above, using condition (7) instead of (5).
Proof. of Proposition 3
(i) Position of EL. At equilibrium, we must necessarily have α EL = b α EL + d, otherwise EL would have an incentive to make a small deviation to the right and become the winner for sure.
A marginal move to the left would give rise to the victory of party ER and is therefore not desirable from the point of view of party EL.
Position of L.
A marginal deviation to the left by L would lead to the election of ER.
Because α EL = −α ER andα L < 0, L prefers that EL be elected rather than ER. At equilibrium, we cannot have α L < b α L + d, or L would prefer to deviate toward the center in order to ensure the election of EL.
(ii) We have to show that, for the configuration of platforms derived in (i), the extreme parties garner more votes than the center ones. The number of votes received by EL and L at equilibrium are given by
Consequently,
This is always true if (8) is satisfied.
The analysis in (i) has shown that no party has an interest to slightly deviate from its position. By continuity, no party has an incentive to deviate at all provided that d is low enough.
(iii) The sufficient conditions for an equilibrium not to exist are derived from the following observations. First, we write the number of votes obtained by party L when EL deviates to
Moreover, we have that the number of votes received by ER is not affected by this deviation:
where the inequality follows from the fact that b α L + d ≤ 0 and b α EL + d ≤ b α L − d (following the assumption that the credibility sets do not overlap). Then if (9) is satisfied, n L is larger than n ER (which is itself larger than n R and n EL ) and L is the winner of the election. Condition (10) simply states that EL prefers that L be the winner alone rather than a tie between EL and ER.
Proof. of Proposition 4
The first-order conditions on α L and α R are:
In a symmetric equilibrium, α = 0. Therefore b α L < α (resp. b α R > α) and v 0 L (α) < 0 (resp. v 0 R (α) > 0). It follows that the first-order conditions are satisfied if and only if
This yields
Therefore α L = −1 and α R = 1 is a local equilibrium when f (0) ≤ 1/2.
It remains to be shown that the second order conditions are satisfied for the interior solution.
The second order condition for party L is given by
Dividing the left hand side of (13) by F ((α L + α R ) /2), we obtain:
At equilibrium, recalling that α R = 1/2f (0) > 0, party L should never play α L ≥ α R . Therefore
with α L , necessarily dα/dα L must be increasing with α L , that is d 2 α/dα 2 L > 0. The second order condition for party R is given by
If f (0) > 1/2, we have dα/dα R = 0 and v 0 R (α) > 0 when α L = −α R = −1/2f (0) . A sufficient condition for d 2 Π L /dα 2 L < 0 is then d 2 α/dα 2 L < 0. Dividing the left hand side of (14) by 1 − F ((α L + α R ) /2), we obtain:
This expression is negative if (f/ (1 − F )) 0 ≥ 0. One can show that, when the distribution function is symmetric, the two conditions, (f/F ) 0 ≤ 0 and (f/ (1 − F )) 0 ≥ 0, are equivalent.
Proof. of Proposition 5
Following (2a) − (2d) and (12), we have:
First-order conditions for parties EL and L at a symmetric interior equilibrium are
( 1 6 ) >From the first order condition on α EL , one immediately sees that α EL < α L at an interior equilibrium.
Using (15) which means that
Comparing this with the result for two party competition, one immediately sees that moderate platforms are closer from 0 with 4 parties than with 2. Furthermore, we obtain that F ³ α EL +α L 2´< 1 4 at an interior equilibrium. We next verify that the above result (moderate platforms closer to the center with four parties) holds true when some parties propose corner platforms. When f (0) ≤ 1/2, the two parties competition lead to corner solutions. The outcome with four parties cannot then be more extreme in such a case. We now prove that the moderate platform is closer to the center with four parties when f (0) > 1/2: As soon as f (0) > 1/2, this expression is negative. Hence the conclusion. Observe that this implies that a full corner solution is impossible when f (0) > 1/2.
We now turn to the second order conditions. The proof that d 2 α/dα 2 EL > 0 is similar to the proof for party L in the two party case. As for party L, making use of (15), (16) becomes
We have already shown in the proof for party L in the two party case that the sum of the second and third terms is increasing in α L provided that f (x) /F (x) is decreasing with x. Using the same technique (i.e. dividing by F ³ α EL +α L 2´a nd then differentiating with respect to α L ), it is easy to show that the first term is also increasing in α L under the same conditions. We thus obtain that the second order conditions are satisfied in this case. Using similar arguments, one can verify that the second order conditions for parties R and ER are satisfied if f (x) / (1 − F (x)) is increasing with x, which is equivalent to the requirement that f (x) /F (x) is decreasing with
x for a symmetrical f (x).
